Where Does Your Intent Go and How It Behaves? A Robustness Study of Intent Reachability and Handling in Android Systems by Yan, Xu
WHERE DOES YOUR INTENT GO AND HOW IT BEHAVES?
A ROBUSTNESS STUDY OF INTENT REACHABILITY AND HANDLING IN
ANDROID SYSTEMS
A Thesis
by
XU YAN
Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
Chair of Committee, Guofei Gu
Committee Members, Yoonsuck Choe
Jim Xiuquan Ji
Head of Department, Dilma Da Silva
May 2015
Major Subject: Computer Science
Copyright 2015 Xu Yan
ABSTRACT
In Android systems, inter-process communication relies heavily on intent, which
can be understood as a message between apps. However, (i)intents can be hijacked
when they are transmitted from senders to receivers. Even if received securely,
due to developer’s underestimation of intent data complexity, (ii)intents can cause
exceptions in their receivers. An app is at the risk of losing response, and even
crashing if it fails to handle the exceptions properly.
To deal with the two potential problems above, we added an Android framework-
layer module to reject the installation of suspicious apps that may hijack intents
during transmission. In addition, we proposed and implemented FuzzingDroid, a
utility tool that generates various relevant intents to fuzz test publicly-accessible
intent receivers in apps. The tool is important because it helps developers detect the
weakness of their incoming intent handling code before they release their apps. At
its core, FuzzingDroid relies on our instrumented Android framework-layer module
to generate the variant parts in fuzzing intents. The outcome of using FuzzingDroid
is pretty good: after analyzing 47 highly-downloaded apps from Google Play Store,
46 highly-downloaded apps from other popular online app markets, 45 core system
apps from LG Nexus 5 and 32 core system apps from XiaoMi phone respectively, we
found 49 of the total 170 apps were crashed due to various intent handling deficiencies.
FuzzingDroid is also a very efficient tool. It takes about 1 minute to fuzz an app
completely with only 5% increase in CPU utilization and 24MB increase in memory
utilization.
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1. INTRODUCTION
IPC is short for inter-process communication. In Android systems, an applica-
tion runs in a dalvik virtual machine instance. Each dalvik virtual machine instance
runs in a separate process. Therefore, Android IPC mechanism is critical for inter-
application communication. There are three types of IPC mechanisms in Android:
(i) Binder, which allows one app to call a routine in another app by identifying the
method to invoke and passing arguments between apps, (ii) ASHMEM, which de-
clares a part of memory that can be shared by apps, and (iii) Intent, which is used
as a message by an app component to start another app component either in the
same process or different processes. Intent is the most heavily-used IPC mechanism
in Android systems.
The two primary pieces of information in an intent are receiver and data. In
explicit intent, receiver is specified with package name and class name. In implicit
intent, receiver is specified with an action. Action can be understood as a require-
ment that receiver must satisfy in order to be eligible to receive the intent. Each
receiver in an app can declare what kind of intent it can deal with in the app’s
configuration file AndroidManifest.xml. Android system is responsible for resolving
and dispatching implicit intents to their receivers. Data is optional depending on if
a sender has information to share with a receiver. Normally, data can be represented
in a form of key-value pair(referred as Extras in Android) or unified resource identi-
fier to MIME type data, such as images, videos, etc. An example of implicit intent
is Action:ACTION VIEW—Data:tel:2144996577, it will be received by phone dialer
with 2144996577 filled in.
Intent IPC mechanism can become an attack surface if used inappropriately. Two
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well-known intent-based attacks are (i) Intent Spoofing: If an intent receiver does
not restrict who may send it intents, then an attacker may forge and inject malicious
data into it, even complete privileged operations using the intent receiver as a proxy
(commonly referred as Privilege Escalation Attack[1]). (ii) Intent Hijacking: If an
intent sender does not specify the receiver explicitly, then an attacker may intercept
the intent in the middle and make the expected intent receiver unreachable. Intent
Spoofing attack can be defended by checking intent sender’s permission at intent
receiver side. However, defending Intent Hijacking is more complicated.
1.1 Intent reachability study
The difficulty to launch Intent hijacking attack depends on the type of target
intent receiver. If the receiver is an activity, attackers have to fabricate their malicious
apps to be as similar to their target apps as possible. Like phishing attack, an attacker
tries to confuse users when they select the app to complete from candidate list. If the
receiver is a service or an ordered broadcast receiver, when multiple intent receivers
can deal with the same implicit intent, Android systems will automatically start the
most appropriate one following the “First Loaded, First Served” rule.
Most existing state-of-the-art approaches detect intent hijacking with static anal-
ysis. ComDroid[2], proposed by Chin et al., statically analyzes dalvik executable files
of an Android app. Comdroid defines intent declaration statements as sources and
APIs that are used to send an intent to receiver as sinks. Comdroid will issue a
warning when it finds a special source-sink connection, where the source declares an
implicit intent but the sink does not specify any permission that protects the implicit
intent. CHEX[3], proposed by Long Lu et al., detects possible hijacking-enabled flows
by conducting reachability test on customized system dependence graph. A common
feature of these tools is they need to be downloaded, configured and run against an
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app to decide whether the app is suspicious at intent hijacking or not.
Complementary to previous work on intent hajiacking detection, we prevent the
threat from system’s perspective by adding a new Android framework-layer module
in Android Open Source Project (AOSP hereafter). Our solution does not put any
burden on end users. In addition, we approach the detection of implicit intent hi-
jacking from a new perspective. Simply speaking, our module rejects the installation
of an app if it intentionally overstates its capability to deal with implicit intent. We
will talk about this in detail in section 4 of the thesis.
1.2 Intent handling study
Even if an intent is received by its expected receiver, due to the dynamic nature
of an intent object, the receiver may underestimate the complexity of data associ-
ated with the incoming intent and fail to resolve the intent properly. The failure
may lead to app crash and even phone restart. Fuzzing test is suitable to detect
this kind of bugs in apps because (i) Intent can be sent by any app at any time, (ii)
Android system provides comprehensive APIs to associate various types of data with
an intent. Therefore, developers can easily generate random and semi-valid intents
and send them to target apps to test those apps’ robustness when handling incoming
intents. Existing state-of-the-art approaches to fuzz data associated with an intent
during IPC rely on static analysis tools to collect what kind of data is expected in
an intent. However, the preprocessing stage with static analysis is time-consuming.
Besides, it can generate false positives sometimes.
Complementary to those works, we propose FuzzingDroid, the fastest automated
testing tool that can find out and test each type of publicly-accessible intent receivers
with whatever data they expect. Simply speaking, FuzzingDroid will intercept data
extraction call from an intent at runtime and redirect the call to our intrumented
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Android framework-layer module. Our module will be responsible for returning vari-
ous data of expected type back to the intent receiver. With our design, what type of
data an intent should carry is not necessary to be known beforehand at all. This can
save a big amount of time during fuzzing process. With our FuzzingDroid, we tested
47, 46 highly-downloaded apps from Google Play Store and other popular online app
markets respectively. We also tested 45 and 32 core system apps from Nexus 5 and
XiaoMi phone respectively. From these, we found 28.8% tested apps contain at least
one intent handling deficiency that can crash the app.
1.3 Contributions
The major contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows,
(1) We present an in-depth study of implicit intent reachability in Android systems.
We observe that implicit intent hijacking can be triggered deterministically when an
implicit intent is used for starting service or sending ordered broadcast in Android
systems. Android systems will follow a “First Load, First Served” rule when select-
ing implicit intent receivers that are equally eligible.
(2) We implement an Android framework-layer module to reject the installation of
suspicious apps and modify the logic when Android systems resolve an implicit intent
from systems´ perspective to defend intent hijacking.
(3) We propose FuzzingDroid, a novel and fastest fuzzing test tool to automatically
trigger potential bugs in an app’s publicly-accessible intent receivers by sending in-
tents with random and unexpected data.
(4) An in-depth evaluation of FuzzingDroid with respect to its runtime performance
and efficacy in bug detection.
4
1.4 Thesis outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces related works.
Section 3 introduces background knowledge of Androids´ intent receivers and app
configuration file. Section 4 describes our study on ensuring intent reachability to
target receiver. Section 5 presents the design and implementation of FuzzingDroid.
Section 6 summarizes our conclusions.
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2. RELATED WORK
Aravind et al. proposed a system called Dynodroid[4] for generating motion
and data inputs to mobile apps. Their tool can fuzz smartly by selecting program
paths that have not been explored before and can allow human to generate inputs
when necessary. However, Dynodroid restricts apps from communicating with other
apps and reverts to the app under test upon observing such communication. Jesse
Burns proposed a unprivileged Null Intent Fuzzer[5] that injects valid intents with
the blank data field to other apps publicly-accessible components. This is the first
fuzzer on intent. However, the test coverage is quite restricted since an intent from
this fuzzer never contains any data at all. An empirical study of the robustness on
inter-component communication by Maji et al.[6] extended the Null Intent Fuzzer by
creating a set of valid and semi-valid intents with object fields selectively left blank.
Besides, they are the first to add extra data field in their fuzzing intents. The Intent
Fuzzer by Raimondas et al.[7] improves the work further by crafting intent with
expected structure to cover more program paths. Their work relies on FlowDroid
to collect intent extras data field information instead of using purely random data
during fuzzing process. Hui Ye et al. proposed DroidFuzzer[8] to fuzz UIs with URI
data(e.g., “video/*”, “image/*”, etc.). DroidFuzzer modifies the inner structure of
expected MIME type data and sends the abnormal data to target UI. Their tool
successfully crashes several popular video and audio players. However, MIME data
is only one type of data an intent can carry and UI is only one type of intent receivers.
Our FuzzingDroid can also fuzz commonly-used URI-based MIME type data, such
as video, audio, image and URL data. Kun Yang et al. proposed IntentFuzzer[9] and
fuzzed publicly-accessible intent receivers with properly-constructed intents. Their
6
fuzzing process is feedback driven. Their tool relies on the debugger log to collect
appropriate intent extras infomation on each round. However, our FuzzingDroid is
much more efficient at intent extras information collection and fuzzing intents can
be constructed properly with much shorter time.
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3. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide a brief overview of which components in an Android
application can send and receive intent (We refer those components that can receive
intents from other components as intent receivers hereafter). Then we present how
to determine which intent receivers an Android app contains. Finally, we introduce
how to launch intent hijacking from attacker’s perspective and what can cause intent
receiver to crash briefly.
3.1 Intent receivers
An Android app is composed by components. Of the four types of component in
Android apps, Activity, Service and BroadcastReceiver can send and receive messages
to/from other components either in the same or different processes. Activity is user
interface in foreground. Service is background task that performs long-running op-
erations, such as downloading service, audio playing service, etc. BroadcastReceiver
responds to system-wide broadcast announcements. E.g. A BOOT COMPLETE
message will be broadcasted when an Android device is turned on and ready to be
used. All broadcast receivers that register as recipients of the BOOT COMPLETE
will be notified synchronously. Android systems also support ordered broadcast. An
ordered broadcast will be dispatched to its receivers asynchronously according to
their priorities.
In Android systems, the message between different components is an intent object.
An intent must indicate its receiver and could contain data shared between sender
and receiver. We focus on implicit intent[10] in our study. Instead of specifying
receiver with full-qualified class name, implicit intent indicates a general action to
perform. Android system service (Package Manager Service) will match the intent
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against candidates that can fulfill the action to decide which receiver should be the
destination.
3.2 App configuration file
Each Android app contains a configuration file called AndroidManifest.xml. It
specifies package name, requested permissions, the components an app is composed
of, etc. A component is public if its declaration sets the EXPORTED flag or includes
at least one 〈intent − filter〉[11]. Only public intent receiver can be invoked by
components from different apps.
For any public intent receiver that can receive implicit intent, it must contain at
least one 〈intent−filter〉, which restricts incoming intents by action, data, category,
or any subset thereof. Action field specifies a general operation to be performed.
E.g. “ACTION VIEW” specifies the component is eligible to render contents to
users. Data field specifies the type of data to operate on. Normally, data is identified
by URI (Uniform Resource Identifier). Category field gives additional information
about the action to execute.
A public intent receiver may request the senders to have permissions sometimes.
3.3 Threat model
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the upper two scenarios represent potential implicit
intent hijacking. Attackers typically need to first decompress Android installation
package(apk) to extract AndroidManifest.xml. Secondly, attackers need to filter out
publicly-accessible intent receivers that set the EXPORTED flag or includes at least
one 〈intent − filter〉. Thirdly, attackers need to declare a component with the
same 〈intent− filter〉 in his malicious app. When the malicious app is installed on
device, the malicious component will have the potential to hijack the implicit intent
that matches the declared 〈intent − filter〉. If the intent receiver is a service, the
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attack will lead to Denial-of-Service(DoS) attack. If the intent receiver is an ordered
broadcast receiver, the attack can lead to DoS, or even Man-in-the-Middle(MITM)
attack. The third scenario indicates the inappropriate processing of data extracted
from an incoming intent. E.g., if the intent receiver does not check the validity of
extracted data before operating on the data, exceptions may be triggered at runtime
and crash the whole app immediately.
Figure 3.1: Overall threat model
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4. STUDY ON ENSURING INTENT REACHABILITY TO TARGET
RECEIVER
Intent Hijacking has been reported for quite a while, ever since 2011[2]. However,
how it is triggered has not been sufficiently studied. To gain an in-depth understand-
ing of intent hijacking prerequisite and complexity, we study the questions “What
rule Android system follows to determine “the most appropriate” intent receiver?”
and “How easily can intent hijacking be launched?” by designing a series of ex-
periments for each type of intent receiver. In this section, we will try to answer
the question and present what we can do about the problem from Android systems’
perspectives.
4.1 Experiments
4.1.1 Activity experiments
We have system default browser and Chrome browser installed in our device.
Both browsers are publicly-accessible and can handle an implicit intent as below:
Intent i = new Intent();
i.setAction(Intent.ACTION_VIEW);
i.setData(Uri.parse("https://howdy.tamu.edu"));
When Android systems resolve the implicit intent, they will search for an activity
that can render the webpage at “https://howdy.tamu.edu” to users. Since both
system default browser and Chrome browser can deal with the intent, the user will
be prompted to choose which browser the intent should go to if a default choice has
not already been set, as shown in Figure 4.1. Activity hijacking is difficult to be
successful because Android system always prompts a dialog explicitly to users. This
11
kind of hijacking cannot succeed without user’s notice. An attacker has to struggle
to fool users with a confusing app name and implement a malicious activity that is
similar enough to the original acitivity so that users cannot differentiate them at all.
Figure 4.1: Activity experiments result
4.1.2 Service experiments
We have two apps, which contain Service A and B respectively, installed in our
device. Both Service A and B are publicly-accessible and can handle the exactly
same implicit intent (same action, data, category fields, etc. in 〈intent − filter〉):
After sending an implicit intent to Android system, unlike Activity Experiment,
there is no prompt dialog shown at all. One of the matching service will be started
automatically. Instead of starting a matching service randomly as mentioned in
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previous work, in fact, Android system will start service deterministically. In our
experiment, we make one service to be loaded to Android system firstly. As for the
other one, we load it secondly but start it immediately after loaded. As shown in
Table 4.1, Android system always starts the first loaded service to respond to the
implicit intent. Service hijacking is not apparent to users because there is no user
interface involed explicitly. Therefore, service hijacking is not hard to be launched
successfully by attacker.
Service A Service B Result
Experiment I Load Firstly Start Firstly A starts
Experiment II Start Firstly Load Firstly B starts
Table 4.1: Service experiments result
4.1.3 Ordered broadcast receiver experiments
Similarly, Ordered Broadcast receiver I and II can handle the same implicit in-
tent. The only difference with previous experiments is the involvement of priority
in broadcast receiver. Priority is an integer value greater than -1000 and less than
1000. For two broadcast receivers with different priority, the one with larger value
is always the first one to receive ordered broadcast firstly. A question is, “which one
of receiver I and II will be the first to receive ordered broadcast when they have the
same priority?” After the following three experiments in Table 4.2, we found loading-
sequence dominates when two broadcast receivers are equally eligible to receive an
ordered broadcast.
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Receiver I Receiver II Result
Experiment I P:300 P:200 R1→R2
Experiment II
P:300
(loaded firstly)
P:300
(start firstly)
R1→R2
Experiment III
P:300
(start firstly)
P:300
(loaded firstly)
R2
Table 4.2: BroadcastReceiver experiments result
4.1.4 Experiment summary
From the three series of experiments above, we draw the conclusion that, (i)
Android system will follow “First Loaded, First Served” rule when more than one
services/order broadcast receivers can deal with the same implicit intent. (ii) Ser-
vice/Ordered Broadcast Receiver hijacking is easier to be successful because users
will not be provided the chance to select their targets explicitly.
4.2 Load sequence
Since Android system relies on “First Loaded, First Served” rule to select the
most appropriate implicit intent receiver, we studied the factors that influence app
loading sequence. First of all, where to put an app installation package plays a
significant role. At device boot time, apps will be loaded one by one. According to
AOSP, Android system will scan the following directories, if exists, for application
installation packages in sequence.
vendorOverlayDir: /vendor/overlay/
framworkDir: /system/framework/
privilegedAppDir: /system/priv-app/
systemAppDir: /system/app/
vendorAppDir: /vendor/app/
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oemAppDir: /oem/app/
mAppInstallDir: /data/app/
mDrmAppPrivateInstallDir: /data/app-private/
According to my experience with LG nexus 5 with native Android OS and Xiaomi
Phone with customized MIUI OS, systemAppDir and mAppInstallDir are the most
commonly-used directories for app storage. For those apps that come with device are
stored in “/system/app/” directory, such as browser.apk, calendar.apk, etc. User-
installed apps, such as skype.apk, facebook.apk, etc., are stored in “/data/app/”
directory. Root privilege is needed to access most of the directories listed above.
From an attacker’s point of view, it is very difficult to obtain root privilege of device.
So it is impossible for a malicious app to place itself in vendorOverlayDir. What
attackers can manipulate is the fact that apps in each directory are sorted according
to the alphabetical order of their file name. In other words, if a malicious app, which
contains the malicious intent receiver for hijacking, is named “A.apk” and put in
directory“/data/app”, it is likely to deny the benign services or become the first one
to receive ordered broadcast when implicit intent is resolved by Android systems.
4.3 System architecture
The prerequisite of the threats is the presence of malicious service/broadcast
receiver in Android devices. Therefore, we propose our first defense strategy :
Prevent malicious services/broadcast receivers from being installed to devices, as
shown in Figure 4.2 - Approach 1. Existing work focuses on statically analyzing
decompiled dalvik executables and looking for the sending of implicit intent without
permission protection. We approach the problem in a more lightweighted way. As
mentioned earlier in the section, malicious components need to declare exactly the
same 〈intent − filter〉 information as the benign component in order to hijack the
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implicit intent for benign component. For developer-defined actions, the best prac-
tice is to use package name as a prefix to ensure uniqueness according to Android
Developer Guide[12]. However, the best practice is not followed by a lot of developers
because of its strictness. But normally the action field in an 〈intent− filter〉, if as
a developer-defined action, is always related to the app’s package name. Therefore,
we can determine whether to reject the installation of an app based on the following
rule: If any intent receiver in an app declares any developer-defined ac-
tion that is completely irrelevant to the apps package name, the app will
be rejected. The checking procedure is completed by our instrumented Android-
framework layer module. Since the original flow to install an app needs to decompress
and extract information from AndroidManifest.xml anyway, in our change, the only
extra step is to extract the action field of an 〈intent−filter〉 and send to our check-
ing module. The time overhead is nearly negligible. Our second defense strategy
is to provide selection dialog with matching intent receivers as options, as shown
in Figure 4.2 - Approach 2. This strategy is inspired by Android system’s strategy
to resolve multi-activity matching problem. We change the control flow of how an
implicit intent is processed and inject code to show a selection dialog when there are
more than one components can fulfill the implicit intent’s request. Users differentiate
components by their package names.
4.4 Defense evaluation
Defense at Installation is effective at reducing the vulnerability, but the strictness
may lead to false positives. We checked the top 50 highly-downloaded apps in Google
Play Store in order to understand how many developers are accustomed to using
package name as prefix when defining implicit intent actions. There are 335 publicly-
accessible intent receivers, 670 actions (482 Google-defined actions and 188 developer-
16
Figure 4.2: Defense architecture
defined actions) in the 50 apps. We found only 59 of 188 follow the best practice. We
studied developers’ package naming habits and found out nearly all developers put
their companies’ names immediately after “com”, “net”, etc. Therefore, we set our
reject rule to require “a developer-defined action should at least contain company
name as a part”. With this change, FP rate is reduced by 44% further. In our
implementation, when an app does not satisfy the rule, we show users a warning
that the app is suspicious. Users are given an option to continue the installation if
they trust the app. Another improvement to reduce FP rate is we only applies the
rule to apps from untrusted sources. We trust apps downloaded from popular online
markets with strict malicious review mechanism.
Defense at Runtime depends on users explicit selection to prevent the vulnera-
bility. Although there may be chances for a malicious app to be installed as well, we
think the probability should be lower than before.
17
Our defense strategies are completely from Android System’s perspective and
does not lead to extra burden for device users.
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5. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF FUZZINGDROID
This section focuses on how to expose the deficiency of intent handling code
in an intent receiver before an app is released to market. Our idea is to fuzz the
publicly-accessible intent receiver using random and unexpected intents and monitor
debugger console for triggered exceptions. We designed and implemented a tool
called FuzzingDroid to assist developers in testing their apps. FuzzingDroid consists
of two parts. One is running on device as an Android app in the same environment
with other apps to be tested. This part is responsible for sending intents to app
components to be diagnosed. The other part runs as an Android framework-layer
module, which takes charge of generating different extras field for a fuzzing intent.
We will discuss the details in the rest of this section.
5.1 FuzzingDroid design
The overview of FuzzingDroid is depicted in Figure 5.1. For each target app, the
fuzzing workflow consists of the following 5 steps:
(1) Extract publicly-accessible intent receivers from AndroidManifest.xml
(2) Generate intent prototype with data, action, categories and flags
(3) Send intent prototype to Android system
(4) Intercept extras extraction call and Return fuzzing extras values
(5) Monitor exceptions
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Figure 5.1: FuzzingDroid architecture
5.1.1 Extraction of publicly-accessible intent receiver
Since each publicly-accessible intent receiver is described in AndroidManifest.xml
and cannot be altered after installation, it is straightforward to parse this file for
fuzzing targets. We care about package name, 〈intent − filter〉 information, such
as 〈action〉, 〈category〉, 〈data〉, 〈flag〉, etc. and the permissions that protect the
receivers. Package name is an app’s unique identifier. It helps tracking the fuzzing
process when FuzzingDroid is used to test apps on a large scale. 〈intent − filter〉
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tag indicates the detailed information about what an implicit intent should be in
order to be received by the its target component. As mentioned earlier, we only
care about those intent receivers that set EXPORTED flag or contain at least one
〈intent− filter〉 tag because only those intent receivers can receive implicit intent.
To increase test coverage, our FuzzingDroid is granted commonly-used normal and
dangerous permissions in order to be capable of fuzzing those intent receivers that
are protected by these common permissions. For intent receivers that are protected
by signature or higher permissions or any permissions our FuzzingDroid does not
have, the intent receiver will not be tested further.
5.1.2 Generate intent prototype with data, action, categories and flags
In the second step, FuzzingDroid will construct intent prototypes with informa-
tion collected from 〈intent−filter〉 in the first step. Intent prototype is semifinished
intent without “Extras” field. With Action, Category, Data and Flag fields, the in-
tent prototype should be able to reach its target receiver successfully. For each
publiclly-accessible intent receiver, there will be at least one intent prototype.
Set Action: It is possible for an intent receiver to declare more than one action.
But an intent object can only set one specific action. To fuzz an intent receiver
efficiently, we will start as many threads as declared actions in an intent receiver.
Each thread sends its own intent prototype with a unique action.
Set Category: It is possible for an intent receiver to declare multiple categories.
An intent prototype must contain all the declared categories to be matched by its
target receiver.
Set Data: We can infer data type that component is able to handle from 〈data〉 tag
inside 〈intent − filter〉. Data is specified by scheme, host, port and path for each
part of the URI scheme://host:port/path. We store common data types as URI in
21
FuzzingDroid. Our FuzzingDroid supports image/*, video/*, http/https. When no
〈data〉 tag in 〈intent− filter〉 or required data is unsupported by FuzzingDroid, our
fuzzing intent will go without any Data URI.
Set Flag: Flags are predefined values for instructing Android system how to launch
an activity. Our FuzzingDroid sets flag as “FLAG ACTIVITY NEW TASK” when
receiver is activity.
5.1.3 Send intent prototype to Android system
Our FuzzingDroid sends the intent prototype to Android system. With all the
important fields properly filled in in last step, the intent prototype should be matched
by its intent receiver, e.g. FuzzingDroid sent an implicit intent prototype for Chrome,
Chrome should be shown as an option in the selection dialog after the implicit intent
is resolved by Android system. The way an intent is sent to Android system depends
on the type of the intent receiver. If intent receiver is Activity, “startActivity(Intent
i)” or “startActivityForResult(Intenti, int requestCode)” will be used; If intent re-
ceiver is Service, “startService(Intent i)” will be used; If intent receiver is broadcas-
tReceiver, “sendBroadcast(Intent i, String rcvrPermission)” or “sendOrderedBroad-
cast(Intent i, String recvrPermission)” will be used.
5.1.4 Intercept extras extraction call and return fuzzing extras values
The extras field of an intent is the core fuzzing variant part. Extras are key-value
pairs that provide extended information to the intent receiver. Keys are strings while
values can be any Java primitive type or class. E.g. If I have an intent to send an
email message, I can also include extra pieces of data here to supply a subject, body,
etc. FuzzingDroid sends intent prototypes without extras. When an intent receiver
tries to extract extras value with key from intent prototype, it will use Extras ex-
traction library in Android Runtime Layer, as shown in Figure 5.1. since intent pro-
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totype does not contain Extras field, the extraction call is intercepted and redirected
to our FuzzingDroid@AOSP module, which is in Android framework-layer. Fuzzing-
Droid@AOSP stores our fuzzing variants for supported Java primitives, composites
and objects. Upon receiving a request, FuzzingDroid@AOSP will return a random
value of proper type to the intent receiver for further processing. E.g. An intent
receiver may extract a string password according to a string username with “passwd
= intent.getStringExtra(username)”, Our injected code will redirect “getStringEx-
tra()” to FuzzingDroid@AOSP, which may return empty string, or null string, or
string with any combination of punctuation, digits and unreadable characters ran-
domly. These returned value will be assigned to “passwd” for further processing in
the intent receiver being fuzzed.
5.1.5 Monitor exceptions
Logcat, which is a console debugger for collecting and viewing system debug
output, is monitored for abnormality. Logcat output can be filtered based on the
package name nad emergency of information, e.g., Error, Warning, Info, etc.. During
fuzzing process, we restrict logcat to only output error information from a specific
package name that is being fuzzed at that time because we only care about the
uncaught exceptions, which will lead to errors, triggered by our FuzzingDroid. A
example of Logcat output is shown in Figure 5.2.
5.2 FuzzingDroid implementation
5.2.1 Architecture
We built our FuzzingDroid as an app on Android system for three reasons. Firstly,
it is convenient to monitor fuzzing progress. FuzzingDroid is designed to output info
about which intent receiver is being fuzzed, what are the fuzzing parameters, etc.
Secondly, it is convenient to fuzz intent receivers protected by normal permissions
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Figure 5.2: Logcat sample error output
by granting our FuzzingDroid with those permissions. In other words, more intent
receivers can be fuzzed. Thirdly, ease of use. Fuzzing process gets ready simply after
develpers download our FuzzingDroid on their devices.
In case of crashing system with too much fuzzing intent in a short time, we set a 5-
second buffer time before our FuzzingDroid switching to fuzz another intent receiver.
Each intent prototype is is used 5 times for fuzzing and taken care by one thread at
the same time. Developers can easily adjust parameters to accelerate FuzzingDroid
according to their devices capability.
FuzzingDroid can be used to test multiple apps synchronously. Test in batch is
a time-consuming task. Therefore, we implement the core of our FuzzingDroid as a
background service in Android systems. To facilitate the fuzzing process, Fuzzing-
Droid can be configured to fuzz multiple receivers in an app synchronously, or even
fuzz multiple apps at the same time. For each intent receiver in each app, Fuzzing-
Droid will dispatch as many threads as the number of action fields declared in the
intent receiver to fuzz simultaneously. Each thread will send 5-10 fuzzing intent pro-
totypes to its target intent receiver for coverage.
We use proclogcat[13], which is a perl script designed to track a specifc packages
logcat messages in a stable and reliable way, to monitor fuzzing targets abnormali-
ties.
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Usage of proclogcat:
adb logcat | ./proclogcat [package_name]
5.2.2 System modification
We modified APIs that can extract extras value in AOSP. There are two ways
for an intent to carry extras. The first one is storing extras directly in intent and
read them with intent.getXXXExtra(String key). The second one is storing extras
in a mapping object called Bundle and let intent carry Bundle. Extras can be read
with Bundle.getXXX(String key). XXX can be Int, IntArray, IntegerArrayList, etc.
in both cases.
When these APIs are called by an intent receiver, the call will be redirected
to FuzzingDroid@AOSP, which manages all the random variants of different data
types. It will return the variants to the intent receiver for further processing. With
this mechanism, we never need to worry about the Extras key collection challenge
mentioned in related works.
5.3 FuzzingDroid evaluation
FuzzingDroid satisfies the following three basic usefulness criteria:
(1) Robust: FuzzingDroid can handle complicated real-world apps and seldom crashes.
(2) Black-box: FuzzingDroid does not need app source code. It simply needs An-
droidManifest.xml, which can be obtained by decompressing application package, to
determine fuzzing targets.
(3) Automated: FuzzingDroid needs very little human effort assuming apps have
already been installed on devices.
Usefulness is just baseline, we evaluated FuzzingDroid performance further from
two perspectives, execution overhead and bug detection.
We evaluated FuzzingDroid with Device: LG Nexus 5 with 2GB RAM memory and
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Qualcomm MSM 8974 2300.0 MHz (4-core) CPU. Dataset: 47 highly-downloaded
apps from Google Store, 46 popular apps from other app online markets, 45 core
system apps from Nexus 5 and 32 core system apps from Xiaomi 2s phone. These
apps cover nearly every possible categories. Detailed distribution figures are shown
in Figure 5.3 and 5.4.
Figure 5.3: Distribution of user-download apps by category
5.3.1 Execution overhead
Considering the limitation of device, I specified a 5-second buffer time between
the fuzzing of any two different intent receivers. The average time to fuzz an app
is less than 1 minutes. It took about 2 minutes if taking fuzzing preparation(E.g.
Determining fuzzing target, Setting log filter, etc.) into consideration.
We used an app called “CPU Memory Monitor” to evaluate the CPU and memory
utilization during fuzzing process. “CPU Memory Monitor” is a highly-downloaded
system tool with excellent reviews from its users.
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Figure 5.4: Distribution of system apps by category
Figure 5.5 and 5.6 shows the CPU and memory utilization in device respectively
over a 80-second period, which is a time slot our FuzzingDroid works to test 8 Xiaomi
system apps. During the period, there is a 5% increase in CPU utilization and 24MB
increase in memory usage.
Figure 5.5: CPU utilization during a 80-second fuzzing period
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Figure 5.6: Memory utilization during a 80-second fuzzing period
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5.3.2 Bug detection
Our FuzzingDroid successfully crashes 49 of 170 apps in total (31 crashes from
user-download apps from online app markets, 7 crashes from Nexus 5 system apps,
11 crashes from Xiaomi phone). Nexus 5’s system version is Android 4.4 KitKat.
All system apps in Nexus 5 are developed and maintained by Google inc. Xiaomi
phone’s system version is MIUI, which is a customized Android system. Xiaomi
OS development team keeps several system apps from Google as the system apps in
MIUI, such as Calendar, Bluetooth, etc. Besides, Xiaomi added a lot of their apps as
system apps in MIUI as well, such as MiTalk, MiuiVideo, etc. Since our test device
is Nexus 5, we have to install Xiaomi’s system apps as well. Some of the apps cannot
be installed because of incompatibility issues. But we still got 32 core MIUI system
apps installed. Although FuzzingDroid tested a smaller number of system apps from
MIUI than Nexus 5, more crashes are triggered. Consider the overlapping issues,
MIUI seems to have more intent handling deficiencies than Nexus 5.
Crashes are mostly caused by inappropriate handling of exceptions in program.
For example, We found 22 NullPointerException, 7 ClassNotFoundException, 3 Ille-
galArgumentException, 4 NoClassDefinitionException and a bunch of other excep-
tions. 49 of all the triggered exceptions crashed test apps directly while 2 led to
“Application Not Responding”. When we were collecting the data, we only relied
on the error messages from Logcat. There were also a number of exception warnings
from Logcat output, however, those exceptions are handled well by developers and
were not counted in our bug detection evaluation.
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6. CASE STUDY
6.1 FuzzingDroid case study
Besides the bugs that crash apps, we also care about capability leaks during
fuzzing process. Simply speaking, capability leak indicates the situation where the
permission of an app may be used by other apps indirectly.
6.1.1 CleanMaster
Clean Master can get memory freed by killing background processes. This func-
tionality should have been protected by “android.permission.RESTART PACKAGES”.
Any app can invoke the capability-leaking component
“com.cleanmaster.appwidget.WidgetService” using an intent with action as
“com.cleanmaster.appwidget.ACTION FASTCLEAN” to kill background processes.
6.1.2 FakeCall
Fake Call can fabricate incoming calls and short messages. Any app can reproduce
an incoming call anytime by sending an intent with an “id” field to component
“com.popularapp.fakecall.incall.CallAlarm”. However, this functionality should only
be invoked by apps with “WRITE CALL LOG” permission.
6.2 Case study for intent interception and manipulation
When playing a video with Xiaomi’s system video player, user can capture a
screenshot and save it to gallery by sending an intent with action
“android.intent.action.CAPTURE SCREENSHOT” as ordered broadcast. An in-
teger field “capture delay” in the intent extras will control the delay between the
receiving and execution of taking screenshot. Malicious broadcast receiver can inter-
cept the intent and modify the value of “capture delay” field. The modified intent
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can be sent to its original target (benign broadcast receiver) for further processing.
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7. CONCLUSION
We conducted a robustness study on the life cycle of intent in Android Systems.
From Android system’s perspective, we implemented several framework-layer mod-
ules in Android Open Source Project to facilitate the reachability of implicit intents
to their target receivers; From a developer’s perspective, we implemented Fuzzing-
Droid to test the robustness of intent handling by publicly-accessible intent receivers.
We successfully triggered and detected logic flaws in several popular apps in Android
markets. We evaluated our work from various aspects to prove its effectiveness.
As for future works, we will keep improving FuzzingDroid to fuzz more smartly
with more representative fuzzing variants. Besides, how to expose more vulnerabil-
ities other than bugs is a challenging and interesting problem we want to study in
near future as well.
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